By Mohammed Bello Doka
If the Nigerian state can, on specific dates, negotiate with armed groups, secure the release of clearly identified victims without any exchange of fire, without arrests, and without prosecutions, and still publicly accuse selected political rivals of terror financing, then what exactly does “funding terrorism” mean in Nigeria—and who is truly sustaining it?
Nigeria’s security crisis entered its most dangerous moral phase in 2025, not because violence suddenly escalated, but because contradiction became official policy. Under the administration of Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the Nigerian state has operated two parallel systems: negotiation and protection for armed groups, and media trials for political rivals.
This is not conjecture. It is a matter of record.
When Negotiation Became Doctrine, Not Exception
By mid-2025, the Office of the National Security Adviser under Nuhu Ribadu, majority of Northern Governors on the platform of the APC had formally embraced what they repeatedly described as a “nonkinetic approach” to terrorism and banditry—dialogue, pressure, and contact rather than decisive force.
The government framed this as humanitarian pragmatism. But the dates, numbers, and outcomes expose something far more dangerous.
Kebbi State: 24 Schoolgirls, Clear Dates, Clear Signals
November 17, 2025:
24 schoolgirls were abducted from Government Girls Comprehensive Secondary School, Maga, in Danko-Wasagu Local Government Area, Kebbi State.
November 25–26, 2025:
All 24 schoolgirls were released alive.
Official method:
Federal intervention, DSS involvement, and dialogue with the abductors.
Critical facts:
No exchange of fire reported
No ransom officially acknowledged
No arrests announced
No prosecutions initiated
The abductors disappeared back into the same forests they emerged from—untouched.
What lesson does a criminal network learn from this sequence of dates?
Kwara State: 38 Worshippers, One Attack, Zero Consequences
November 18, 2025:
Armed men attacked Christ Apostolic Church (CAC) Oke Igan, Eruku, Ekiti LGA, Kwara State, abducting 38 worshippers.
Two worshippers were killed during the attack.
November 23, 2025:
All 38 abducted worshippers were released.
Official method:
Joint DSS–military tracking and direct contact with the abductors, resulting in release.
Critical facts:
No gun battle reported
No rescue operation involving force
No public arrest of any kidnapper
No charges filed
Again, the perpetrators walked free.
At this point, how does the government explain deterrence?
Niger State (Papiri): Repetition As Policy, Not Accident
Mid-2025 (Papiri community):
Armed bandits carried out mass abductions in Papiri, a rural community in Niger State, seizing scores of residents, including women and children, during coordinated night raids.
Subsequent days/weeks in 2025:
The abducted victims were released in batches following non-kinetic engagements, involving security agencies’ contact with the abductors and community-level pressure.
Critical facts repeatedly reported:
No exchange of fire during releases
No large-scale rescue assault announced
No publicised arrest of bandit leaders
No court arraignments linked to the abductions
Once again, the pattern held: abduction produced leverage; leverage produced dialogue; dialogue produced freedom—without consequences.
If Papiri was not an isolated incident but a replay of Kebbi and Kwara, at what point does coincidence become doctrine?
When Results Become Incentives
Between mid-2025 and late November 2025, the Nigerian state demonstrated a repeatable formula across Kebbi, Kwara, and Niger States:
Abduction → Negotiation → Release → Freedom.
Not once. Not twice. Three times. Publicly. Successfully.
If terrorism thrives on funding, is guaranteed survival not the most valuable currency of all?
The Accusations Begin—Without Dates, Without Courts
While negotiations were producing releases throughout 2025, the state simultaneously escalated public accusations of terrorism financing against prominent Northern Muslim figures:
Abubakar Malami
Tukur Buratai
Faruk Yahaya
Their names were circulated in late 2025 through media briefings and commentary—yet:
No arrest dates were announced
No charge sheets were published
No trial dates were fixed
No convictions followed
If the evidence is real, why is the courtroom missing from the timeline?
The Bauchi Case: One arrest, Many Questions
Late 2025:
A Bauchi State commissioner was formally arrested on terrorism-financing related charges.
This remains the only confirmed court case tied to terrorism financing in this entire period.
Why one case—out of dozens of public accusations?
Why prosecution here, but press conferences elsewhere?
The Silence That Condemns the State
Between January and December 2025, the government never explained:
Who funds Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)
Who bankrolls Niger Delta militant networks that repeatedly sabotage oil infrastructure
Who finances the Oduduwa separatist agitation linked to Sunday Igboho
Why does terror financing suddenly become urgent only when Northern political figures are involved?
Are terrorists in other regions funded by charity—or protected by silence?
The Trump Shock And The Sudden Search For Scapegoats
In 2025, following Donald Trump’s public accusations and the designation of Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern, international scrutiny intensified.
Soon after, the Sokoto attack in December 2025 further embarrassed the state before the world.
What followed was not reform—but performance.
Instead of admitting systemic failure, the government pivoted to selective outrage, naming rivals, leaking allegations, and staging seriousness for external audiences.
Is this counter-terrorism—or crisis management?
Follow the Money—or Follow the Pattern?
From mid-2025 through November 2025, the record is now unmistakable:
More than 100 abducted Nigerians released across Kebbi, Kwara, and Niger States
Zero kidnappers arrested
Zero prosecutions announced
Zero terror networks dismantled
At the same time:
Multiple political figures accused
One commissioner arraigned
No comprehensive financial trails disclosed
So ask the unavoidable question:
If terrorism financing is the problem, why does the state dismantle reputations faster than networks?
The Question History Will Ask
Can terrorism survive without money? No.
Can it survive without predictable state behavior? Also no.
So the final question, sharpened by dates, numbers, and patterns, remains:
Who is really funding terrorism in Northern Nigeria—the individuals named without trials, or the state that, repeatedly in 2025, proved that abduction guarantees dialogue, safety, and freedom?
Until negotiations end with arrests, until accusations end with convictions, and until justice is measured in court judgments rather than headlines, Nigeria’s war on terror will remain exactly what 2025 exposed it to be:
A system that rescues victims but preserves the business of terror—by repetition, by denial, and by state-sanctioned predictability.
Mohammed Bello Doka can be reached via bellodoka82@gmail.com
